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ARGUMENT
I.

INTRODUCTION: THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE ANALYSIS OF
BOTH THE SUPERIOR AND THE DISTRICT COURTS AND HOLD THAT THE
TERM "TRADE AND COMMERCE" ENCOMPASSES ANY CONDUCT OCCURRING
IN THE ORDINARY AND REGULAR COURSE OF DEFENDANT 'S BUSINESS
OR IN A BUSINESS CONTEXT.
The private remedies section of the Unfair Trade Practices

Act ("UTPA"), 5 M.R.S.A. § 213, reaches all unfair or deceptive
acts or practices conducted by a defendant in trade or
commerce.1/

This appeal presents a two-part question

concerning the scope of the term "trade or commerce":

(a)

whether the term "trade or commerce" encompasses private
economic transactions between consumers or only encompasses
transactions between consumers and businesses and (b) if the
term encompasses the latter, what standard governs the

I/The term "trade or commerce" is incorporated into § 213 in
the following manner: Section 213 provides private individuals
with a cause of action for loss of money or property which
results from the "use or employment by another person of a
method, act, or practice declared unlawful by section 207."
Section 207, the operative provision of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act, declares as unlawful "[ulnfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts of practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce." (Emphasis added). The terms
"trade" and "commerce" are defined in § 206(3). Infra at 4.

2

determination of whether particular transactions are considered
to have involved businesses.
The District Court (Studstrup, J.) held that § 213 applies
to private transactions between consumers as well as to
transactions between businesses and consumers.

The Superior

Court (Brody, C.J.), rejecting the District Court's analysis,
held that § 213 only applies to conduct involving "merchants"
but not to transactions involving "the casual vendor."

In

essence, the Superior Court limited the reach of § 213 to
conduct arising out of the ordinary course of the seller's
business and excluded those transactions which, while conducted
in a business context, were not part of a regularly conducted
trade or business.
The Attorney General, while agreeing with the Superior
Court's conclusion that "trade or commerce" does not encompass
purely private transactions, urges this Court to reject the
overly restrictive standard adopted by the Superior Court for
determining which transactions are purely private and which are
commercial.

Rather, the Attorney General urges this Court to

adopt a standard, developed by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in a number of cases since 1978, which applies a
number of factors to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
particular transactions have taken place either in the ordinary
course of the seller's business or in a business context.
Under this standard, in contrast to the standard adopted by the
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Superior Court, isolated transactions are covered by the Act if
they arise in a business context.

This standard both provides

trial courts with flexibility to apply the UTPA to a wide
variety of factual situations and recognizes the broad remedial
scope of the Act.
As is more fully set forth in the Attorney General's Motion
for Leave to File Amicus Brief and to Participate in Oral
Argument, the Attorney General has a particularly acute
interest in the resolution of the issue presented by this
appeal.

While this case involves a private action brought

under 5 M.R.S.A. § 213, the legal issue presented here requires
an interpretation of the meaning and scope of 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 206(3) —
"commerce."

the definition of the terms "trade" and
The term "trade and commerce" not only limits the

scope of unfair or deceptive practices under the private
remedies section (§213), but also under the public enforcement
section (§ 209).

Consequently, this Court's decision in the

instant case will determine which type of conduct may be
challenged by the Attorney General in the exercise of the
enforcement responsibilities conferred upon him by 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 209.
II. IN LIGHT OF THE PURPOSE OF THE UTPA, THIS COURT SHOULD
INTERPRET THE TERM "TRADE AND COMMERCE" TO ENCOMPASS ONLY
THOSE TRANSACT IONS BETWEEN CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS
The Law Court has been called upon to interpret provisions
of the UTPA, including § 213, on a number of occasions.
However, the issue raised by this appeal has not previously
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been addressed by this Court.

The definition of "trade" and

"commerce" set forth in § 206(3) is extremely broad and, on its
face, could be applied to virtually every seller and every
economic transaction.

Specifically, § 206(3) defines "trade

and commerce" as including the following:
... the advertising, offering for sale, sale
or distribution of any services and any
property, tangible or intangible, real,
personal or mixed, and any other article,
commodity of thing of value wherever
situate, and shall include any trade or
commerce directly or indirectly effecting
the people of this state.
In interpreting the broad language of § 206(3) we look to the
purpose underlying the UTPA and to decisions interpreting
similar provisions in other states.
The UTPA expands greatly the common law rights and remedies
of both private citizens as well as the Attorney General in
challenging unfair or deceptive commercial activity.

Most

importantly, the UTPA does away with the common law requirement
of proving intent or scienter in fraud or misrepresentation
cases.

The plaintiff in a UTPA action may prevail if he proves

that the defendant has engaged in either deceptive or unfair
conduct regardless of whether the defendant intended such
conduct to be deceptive or unfair.

Additionally, the Act

expands common law remedies by including equitable remedies and
by providing that consumers who prevail under the Act shall
recover their attorney's fees.

5

By expanding the rights of both consumers and the Attorney
General in combating deceptive commercial conduct, the UTPA
attempts to equalize the relationship between consumers and
businesses.

In essence, the UTPA recognizes that businesses

are frequently in a superior bargaining position to consumers
and, consequently, that consumers need the rights and remedies
provided by the Act to equalize that relationship.
As this Court has noted in State v. Ford Motor Co., 436
A.2d 866, 874, n.18 (Me. 1981), no legislative history exists
surrounding the enactment of the UTPA.

In fact, the only

legislative history involving the UTPA is the Statement of Fact
attached to the bill establishing § 213.

The Statement of Fact

provides as follows:
Under the provisions of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act, only the Attorney General may
initiate actions to redress injuries to
consumers. The success of [the Consumer
Fraud] Division has resulted in a rapidly
increasing volume of consumer complaint
petitions and inquiries relating to
deceptive sales practices. A number of
these complaints deal with disputes between
the consumer and the merchant where
investigation by the Attorney General fails
to disclose that the deceptive practice was
utilized in more than one case and therefore
is not a case properly litigated by the
Attorney General. While many of these
so-called private disputes have a good deal
of merit, they often involve claims of
damage involving less than $500 and thus it
is often impossible for the average consumer
to bring suit. These small claims very
rarely generate litigation and fraudulent
business firms bent on cheating the consumer
fully appreciate this fact.
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Under the Private Remedies Amendment the
costs of deceiving the public will be borne
at last by the party who has profited by his
illegal acts, the dishonest merchant.
L.D. 931, Statement of Fact (106th Legis. 1973).

As the

Statement of Fact indicates, the purpose of § 213 was to
provide consumers with an a private cause of action against
"merchants" and "businesses,"
While this Court has yet to address the issue presented by
this appeal, courts in other states, interpreting language
virtually identical to that of the Maine UTPA, have reached
this question.2/

The jurisdictions which have addressed the

meaning of the phrase "trade and commerce" have reached varying
conclusions.

The Texas Supreme Court has adopted the most

expansive interpretation of "trade and commerce" and has
extended application of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA") to every type of seller, regardless of whether the

^/section 207(1) of the UTPA mandates the courts, in construing
the operative provision of § 207, to be guided by
interpretations accorded by the Federal Trade Commission and
the federal courts to the analogous provision of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.S 45(a)(1). However, there is
no federal analogue to the private cause of action embodied in
§ 213. In addition, the Federal Trade Commission Act utilizes
the term “commerce", rather than "trade or commerce" and
defines the term to refer to interstate commerce or commerce
affecting interstate commerce. Accordingly, the federal
decisions are of no assistance in divining the scope of the
term " trade or commerce" as used in the UTPA.
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seller is engaged in the business of selling.
Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tx. 1980).

Pennington v.

The Texas Court based

its expansive interpretation on the fact that there is no
indication in the language of the DTPA that persons not in the
business of selling are to be excluded.

Id. at 691.

Similarly, the Illinois Court of Appeals has held that because
the definitions of "person" and "trade and commerce" do not
limit application of the Illinois Act to businessmen and
merchants, the Act applies to nonmerchant sellers as well.
People Ex Rel. Scott v. Larance, 434 N.E.2d 5 (Ill.App.Ct.
1982)

But see also Bentley v. Slavik, 663 F.Supp. 736

(S.D.I11. 1987) (provision defining "deceptive trade practice"
restricts application to acts committed "in the course of his
business, vocation or occupation".)3/
In contrast to the Texas and Illinois courts, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted a more restrictive
interpretation of the term "trade and commerce" in holding that
the phrase "persons engaged in the conduct of any trade or
commerce," as that term is used in the Massachusetts Consumer

^/Despite the fact that the Larance court apparently overlooked
the language of 111. Rev. Stat. ch.121 1/2, 1f3l2 (1983) which
requires violations of the Act to have been committed in the
course of the seller's "business, vocation or occupation," the
court's interpretation of "trade and commerce" as defined in
the Illinois Act is nonetheless instructive.
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Fraud Act, c. 93A § 11, does not include purely private
transactions between consumers.!/
N .E .2d 973 (Ma. 1978)5/

Lantner v. Carson, 373

in reaching this conclusion, the

Supreme Judicial Court commented on the purpose served by the
Massachusetts Act:
[W]e note that our conclusions with respect
to the scope of G.L.C.93A are not
inconsistent with the statute's broadly
^/section 11 of the Massachusetts Act provides in relevant part
Any person who engages in the conduct of any
trade or commerce and who suffers any loss
of money or property, real or personal, as a
result of the use or employment by another
person who engages in any trade or commerce
of an unfair method of competition or an
unfair or deceptive act or practice declared
unlawful by section two . . . may . . .
bring an action in the superior court . . . .
5/New Mexico and Oregon courts have also been called upon to
determine whether their respective unfair trade practices acts
extend protection to private transactions. The Oregon and New
Mexico acts are modeled after the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, which requires violations to have been committed
"in the course of [the seller's] business, vocation, or
occupation". 7 ULA 336 § 2. Accordingly, the language of the
New Mexico and Oregon acts restricts application of the act to
transactions connected to the seller's business, vocation, or
occupation. See Wolverton v. Stanwood, 563 P.2d 1203 (Or.
1977) (phrase "in the course of his business, vocation, or
occupation" within governing statute to be applied only to
unlawful practices connected at least indirectly with
defendant's ordinary and usual business); In re Klein, 39 B.R.
20 (N.M.Bkrtcy. 1984) ( Unfair Practices Act requires that the
complained of practice occur in defendant's regular course of
trade or commerce and does not apply to isolated transactions).
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protective legislative purpose.
In Dodd v.
Commercial Union Insurance Co ■, __ Mass. ___
365 N.E.2d 802 (1977), we stated that the
basic policy of G.L. c.93A was ‘to regulate
business activities with the view to
providing . . . a more equitable balance in
the relationship of consumers to persons
conducting business activities.' Id. at __ ,
365 N .E .2d at 806, quoting from Commonwealth
v. DeCotis, 366 Mass. 234, 238, 316 N.E.2d
748 (1974) (citation omitted). An
individual homeowner who decides to sell his
residence stands in no better bargaining
position than the individual consumer. Both
parties have rights and liabilities
established under common law principles of
contract, tort, and property law. Thus,
arming the consumer in this circumstance
does not serve to equalize the positions of
buyer and seller. Rather, it serves to give
superior rights to only one of the parties,
even though as nonprofessionals both stand
on an equal footing.6/
In reliance on the Massachusetts court's decision in
Lantner, the New Hampshire Supreme Court has also interpreted
"trade" and "commerce" to extend to isolated transactions which
take place in a trade or business context.

Dorais v. Chase,

448 A.2d 390 (N.H. 1982) (isolated sale of automobile by owner

^/Appellant relies on Lantner as standing for the proposition
that when there is no real estate broker involved in the sale
of real estate, the consumers stand on equal footing, but if a
broker is involved, the parties are in a disparate position
and the provisions of § 213 apply to the transaction.
Appellant's Brief at 20-21. Contrary to Appellant's assertion,
the findings of fact in Lantner indicate that a broker was
involved in the transaction and the court nonetheless
determined that the purchaser and seller stood in equal
bargaining positions. Lantner, 373 N.E.2d at 975.
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who had never before sold a used car did not take place in a
trade or business context therefore the Consumer Protection Act
did not apply).
The Attorney General urges this Court to adopt the analysis
developed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court for
several reasons.

First, Maine's UTPA is substantially similar

to its Massachusetts counterpart.

Of particular significance

to the present appeal is the fact that § 213 is virtually
identical to Massachusetts' private remedy section c.93A § 9
and the definition of "trade and commerce" contained in
§ 206(3) of the Maine Act is identical to the definition of
"trade and commerce" in the Massachusetts Act, c.93A § 1(b).
Second, this Court has recognized the case law developed by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as a primary source of
guidance in interpreting the UTPA.

In virtually every case in

which this Court has been called upon to interpret a provision
of the UTPA, the Court has looked to Massachusetts for
guidance.

See

Bartner v. Carter, 405 A.2d 194 at 201-203 (Me.

1979); state v. Ford Motor Company, 436 A.2d 866, at 874-75
(Me. 1981); State v. Bob Chambers Ford, Inc., 522 A.2d 362 at
366-67 (Me. 1987).

Finally, Massachusetts courts have had

numerous opportunities to address issues under c.93A generally
and specifically under the private remedies section, and,
concomitantly, have developed a considerable body of case law.
For all of these reasons, the Attorney General encourages this
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Court to follow the decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court with respect to the issue presented by this
appeal.
In light of the purpose of the Unfair Trade Practices Act
to equalize the positions between consumers and businesses, and
the viewpoint cogently set forth by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in Lantner, the Attorney General urges this
Court to interpret the terms "trade" and "commerce" to apply
only to transactions between a consumer and a business.

The

purpose underlying the UTPA is not furthered by applying the
Act to private transactions between two consumers.

With

respect to such private consumer-to-consumer transactions, both
parties should be presumed to in equal bargaining positions
and, consequently, there no need exists to provide the
plaintiff consumer with the expanded rights and remedies which
are created by the UTPA.
As is set forth in the succeeding section, the Attorney
General further urges this Court to reject the narrow approach
taken by the Superior Court in this case in excluding isolated,
casual, or occasional business transactions from the reach of
the Act.

Instead, this Court should adopt the more expansive

interpretation of "trade and commerce" utilized by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and apply § 213 to all
transactions which take place in a business context.
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III. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE SUPERIOR COUR T 'S ANALYSIS AND
ADOPT THE STANDARD DEVELOPED BY THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT.
A.

The Massachusettts Supreme Judicial Court has adopted
a flexible and workable standard to evaluate when
transactions occur in a business context.

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that a
seller may be liable under the Massachusetts Consumer Fraud Act
either if the transaction took place in the ordinary course of
the seller's primary trade or business or if the transaction
was conducted by sellers acting in a "business context."
Lantner v. Carson, 373 N.E.2d 973, at 974-975.

In so holding,

the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that the broad
remedial purposes of the Massachusetts Act are well-served by
extending its reach to isolated transactions which, although
not arising in the regular course of business, nonetheless
occur in a business context.
In order to determine when a transaction has taken place in
a business context, the court has developed a multi-factor
standard of analysis which includes the nature of the
transaction, the degree of the seller's participation, and
whether the sale was motivated by personal or business
reasons.

Begelfer v . Najarian, 409 N.E.2d 167, 176 (Ma. 1980).

In adopting this standard of analysis, the court shifted its
focus from the nature of the seller's primary business to a
broader examination of the seller's conduct, experience, and
motivation.
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In Begelfer v. Najarian, supra, the court first applied the
business context analysis and held that a private seller is
subject to liability under the Consumer Fraud Act if the
isolated transaction took place in a business context.

Id. at

176. The court noted that the determination of whether the
transaction took place in a "business context" must be
determined from the circumstances of each case and involves the
application of several factors, namely—

1) the nature of the

transaction, 2) the character of the parties involved, 3) the
activities engaged in by the parties, 4) whether similar
transactions have been undertaken in the past, 5) whether the
transaction is motivated by business or personal reasons, and
6) whether the seller played an active role in the
transaction.

Id. at 176.

Following its decision in Begelfer,

the Supreme Judicial Court apparently added as an additional
consideration whether the transaction had any impact on the
public interest.

Planned Parenthood v. Problem Pregnancy, 498

N .E .2d 1044, 1054 (Ma. 1986).

In adopting this multi-factor

analysis, the Court rejected the notion that a seller is liable
under c .93A § 11 only if the transaction took place in the
primary course of the seller's business.
In evaluating the critical transaction in Begelfer, the
Court found that the defendants, who were pharmacists by trade,
were passive investors in a large real estate transaction and
could not negotiate the terms of the loan at issue, did not
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actively manage the loan, and received loan payments through an
agent.

Id. at 176.

On the basis of these facts, the court

found that the defendants were determined not to have acted in
a business context and were not subject to liability under
C.93A § 11.
In the wake of Begelfer, the Massachusetts courts have
applied the business context analysis to a variety of factual
scenarios.

See Lynn v. Nashawaty, 423 N.E.2d 1052 (Ma. 1981)

(sale of stationery store and inventory to individual not
previously engaged in retail business was conducted in business
context due to fact that sellers had participated in two prior
similar sales and participated fully in all aspects of
negotiation of the purchase and sale agreement); Burley v . Nei,
446 N.E.2d 674 (Ma. 1983) (sellers of subdivided land not
engaged in trade or commerce and sale not conducted in business
context because sellers played only a minor role in sale,
devoted no appreciable time to real estate and reserved to
selves only the right to accept or reject offers to purchase);
Newton v. Moffie, 434 N.E.2d 650 (Ma. App. C t . 1982) (c.93A
§ 11 inapplicable to private transaction between members of the
same partnership); Planned Parenthood v. Problem Pregnancy, 498
N .E .2d 1044 (Ma. 1986) (defendant's unfair and deceptive
methods in competing with the plaintiff for pregnant clients
were designed to have an effect on the public and were
therefore perpetrated within a business context); and Billings
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v. Wilson, 493 N .E ,2d 187 (Ma. 1986) (c.93A § 11 inapplicable
to rental of apartment when landlord occupies unit in building,
owns no other rental property, and motivation for rental is
personal in nature). As the above summary of the Supreme
judicial Court's decisions demonstrate, the business context
test provides courts with a flexible and practical standard to
use in determining which transactions are covered by the act.
B.

The Superior Court erred by purporting to rely on the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in
Lantner v. Carson but failing to adopt and apply the
business context test.

The Superior Court, in reversing the District Court,
purported to rest its decision on the Massachusets Supreme
Judicial Court's holding in Lantner v. Carson, supra. However,
despite the fact that the Superior Court sought guidance from
Massachusetts case law, the court concluded that § 213 applies
only to transactions occurring in the ordinary and regular
course of a defendant's business.

In reaching this conclusion,

the Superior Court failed to acknowledge or apply the business
context analysis adopted by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court and, as a consequence, adopted an overly restrictive
interpretation of "trade and "commerce" which excludes isolated
business transactions from coverage of the Act.
It is the position of the Attorney General that the
Superior Court erred in failing to acknowledge and apply the
business context analysis developed by the Massachusetts
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courts.

The standard of analysis which has evolved in

Massachusetts since Lantner provides courts with workable
criteria for determining whether the seller's participation in
the transaction took place in a business context, despite the
fact that it did not take place in the ordinary course of his
or her primary business.

As the line of Massachusetts cases

demonstrates, application of the business context analysis
transactions results in a more equitable resolution of actions
brought under the private remedy section by rendering liable
those sellers who, by virtue of specific facts, operate in a
business context and stand in a superior position to the
consumer-plaintiff throughout the duration of the transaction.
Continued application of the standard used by the Superior
Court will result in an inequitable result in certain factual
situations.

For example, an individual, who is a farmer by

trade and is not otherwise in the business of selling or
developing real estate, subdivides 40 acres of land which he
purchased several years ago.

The land is divided into eight

five acre parcels and sold by the seller who participates fully
in all aspects of the sales and makes numerous
misrepresentations regarding the capacity of the land to
lawfully dispose of sewage and the availability of
services.

utility

Under the analysis adopted by the Superior Court,

the seller could be regarded a "casual vendor" and a consumer
purchaser of one of the parcels would be precluded from
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maintaining an action under § 213.

Under the Massachusetts

standard, in determining liability under § 213, the trial court
would be able to consider such factors as whether the seller
had previously subdivided and sold real estate, the nature and
extent of the seller's participation in the sale, and the
seller's motivation for the sale (e.g., to raise capital to
purchase farm equipment or to pay for his daughter's wedding
reception). The public interest is not well-served by
protecting such sellers from liability under the UTPA or in
denying purchasers the legal remedies accorded to them under
§ 213.
The business context analysis is consistent with this
Court's position that "[t]he scope of the Unfair Trade
Practices Act has yet to be clearly defined by this Court; its
limits can best be drawn on a case-by-case basis in which the
issues are sharply focused in light of specific fact
situations."
1981).

Edwards v . Black, 429 A.2d 1015, 1017 (Me.

Adoption of the business context analysis is also

consistent with the view that the provisions of the UTPA should
be liberally construed in favor of the consumer, the party for
whom the Act was intended to benefit.

18

CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, for the aforestated reasons, the Department of
Attorney General, as Amicus Curiae, respectfully requests that
this Court adopt the business context analysis as developed by
the Massachusetts courts in determining whether a seller is
engaged in "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Unfair
Trade Practices Act.

Due to the fact that neither lower court

applied the business context standard, no findings were made
with respect to this issue.

In addition, the record contains

insufficient facts to allow this Court to make a determination
as to whether the transaction took place in a business
context.2/

Accordingly, the Attorney General also requests

that this Court vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and
remand this matter to the District Court for further
proceedings consistent with the standard adopted by this Court.

Z^The Plaintiffs state in their Brief that "[i]n 1983,
[Defendant] determined he wished to buy a parcel of land across
the road from his place of business in North Whitefield, sell
it, and keep a portion of it to park used cars upon,"
Appellants Brief at 1. These facts do not appear in the record
and are insufficient in and of themselves to allow the Court to
determine whether the transaction took place in a business
context. The only relevant evidence in the record with respect
to this issue is the following statement by Defendant's former
stepfather: "Gene told me he wanted to buy it, and he wanted to
sell off a portion of it and asked me to survey a line for him
for deed purposes." Trial Transcript, vol. II at 38.

I
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